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CHAPTER 
Rose contra Girard
Kenotic Comedy and Social Theory  
(Or, Žižek as a Reader of Rose)
Marcus Pound
Introduction
For Gillian Rose, Hegel is the social theorist par excellence; Hegel also turns out to be one of the great comic thinkers: Hegel’s social theory 
is comic. It is an insight that Rose carries through into her interest in 
Kierkegaard, and informs her criticism of the social anthropologist and 
literary theorist René Girard whom she charges with a “lack of humour 
and irony.”1 Ostensibly this essay revisits Rose’s critique of Girard from the 
perspective of Hegelian comedy. However, as I argue (in the “severe style”) 
Rose’s comic outlook is compromised by her sense of the tragic. While tak-
ing stock of Rose’s criticism, I propose a Žižekian reading of Girard that 
avoids the severity of Rose while maintaining a fidelity to Hegel’s comedic 
appreciation of the social task. In the first part, I outline Rose’s appropriation 
of Hegel for the critique of social theory. I consolidate her critique by apply-
ing it to Girard’s own writings on comedy and social theory to highlight the 
neo-Kantian element in his work. In the second part, I address Rose’s comic 
1. Rose, The Broken Middle, 141.
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reading of Hegel, and Hegel’s work on comedy, with particular reference 
to the distinction between tragedy and comedy. I critically contrast Hegel 
and Girard’s approaches to the forms. In the third part, I address directly 
Rose’s criticisms of Girard from the perspective of The Broken Middle and 
the subsequent claim that Rose’s ethics of the middle is tragic. I then offer 
an alternative reading of Girard informed by Žižek to rearticulate Rose’s 
middle as comic.
Part I: Hegel and Social Theor y
Rose understood Hegel’s critique of Kant in advance of contemporary 
sociological method, which assumed what she called a neo-Kantian form. 
Kantian philosophy renders a split (diremption/divorce) between the subject 
and object; the transcendental deduction is an attempt to demonstrate that 
despite this split there are key a priori concepts that can be deduced as cor-
rectly applying to objects of our experience.2 In other words, the experience 
of a given object must in some way conform to the categories of cognition; 
we can know a given object through the determinations of experience, even 
if we cannot know that object in-itself. As Rose points out, Hegel’s concern 
was that philosophy was subsequently restricted to the justification of objec-
tive validity by way of the application of the a priori forms of knowledge and 
taken in this fashion any given object of experience can only be understood 
by subordinating it to those forms. As Rose puts it, “a transcendental ac-
count reduces knowledge to experience,’ to the synthesis of appearances. It 
makes the conditions of the possibility of experience in general likewise the 
conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.”3 
Natural Law
The implications of this critique of Kant for social theory are clarified by 
Hegel in his essay on Natural Law from his early Jena period. In Natural 
Law, Hegel critiques the scientific empiricism of Hobbes, amongst other 
natural law theorists, who promulgated an individualist doctrine of rights. 
Their work is scientific to the extent they subject society to the rational 
method/gaze, and empirical because they claim to draw their findings from 
the observation of the world. Hegel draws out the circularity of the argu-
ments involved. Natural law theorists seek to show that individuals living 
2. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A84–130, B116–69.
3. Rose, Hegel contra Sociology, 4.
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together had certain inalienable rights that ought to be respected and, in 
defending the claim, appeal to a hypothetical state of nature. The problem 
arises because “what in the chaos of the state of nature or in abstraction 
of man must remain and what must be discarded .  .  . In this manner, the 
guiding determinate can only be, that as much must remain as is required 
for the exposition of what is found in the real world: the governing principle 
for this a priori is the a posteriori. If something in the idea of a state of law is 
to be justified, all that is required, for the purpose of demonstrating its own 
necessity . . . is to transfer into the chaos an appropriate quality.”4 
Natural law theorists assumed in advance the conclusion they set out 
to prove; they abstract from “everything capricious and accidental,”5 by 
which Hegel means that contingent, historical, social relations and customs 
are subtracted from the social picture to leave only the chaos of individuals 
in nature, which in turn then becomes the basic truth of man. Little wonder 
Hegel considered the priority of individuals in a state of chaos a “fiction.”6
In the same way, a given law can be shown to be grounded in the in-
terests of the governing state, Hegel shows how the “fiction” that grounds 
natural law is taken from bourgeois property relations; that is, natural law 
derives from the want to establish universal private property relations and 
rights. It is not that Hegel wants to condemn private property, but to high-
light how a climate that fosters a space of pure possession can take hold in a 
way that results in pure eudemonism. 
Kant may not be associated with empirical natural law, yet as Hegel 
argues, Kant’s practical reason offered a variant. When Kant tried to give 
content to the form of moral reasoning (the categorical imperative) by ap-
plying it in certain cases, he did so by posing whether the maxim to “in-
crease my wealth by every safe means can hold good as universal if I have a 
deposit in my hands, the owner of which has died and left no record of it?”7 
For Kant, the answer is “no,” because as a general rule, if someone could 
deny holding a deposit on the basis that they would not be found out, the 
practice of deposits would not survive; trust would be undermined. Hegel’s 
point is that the example presupposes the validity of property qua property 
prior to the application of pure reason to determine lawfulness in regard of 
property. Hegel’s criticism, like that of natural law, concerns the conceit of 
using bourgeois property as the basis for universal law. 
4. Hegel, Natural Law, 56–70.
5. Ibid., 63.
6. Ibid., 114.
7. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 25.
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For both Kant and the theorists of natural law, it remains the isolated 
and abstract individual that contractually comes together to form society, 
whereas for Hegel culture is a self-contained whole that must be understood 
in terms of its own laws and dispositions; for Hegel it is not the individual, 
but the state that is prior. Legality cannot be derived from universal prin-
ciples, but only be exhibited in the light of the living individuality of a given 
nation. Therefore, to apply the transcendental method in the realm of social 
thought is, like natural law, to impose a false unity that obfuscates real social 
relations. As Rose says, “a transcendental account necessarily presupposes 
the actuality or existence of its object and seeks to discover the conditions 
of its possibility.”8
Rose and Social Theory: The Diremption of Theoretical and 
Practical Reason
For Rose, the key problem of Kant’s legacy is most acutely felt in the split 
Kant introduces between theoretical and practical reason and the place of 
freedom therein: legality (determinism) and morality (autonomy). Kant 
sets out the a priori conditions for moral experience, induced through the 
categorical imperative, the unconditional rational form for moral thought 
that all rational beings should follow. The imperative relies not on treat-
ing others as a means to an end but on the value placed on humanity as 
a whole, an imperative to determine law in the direction of the Kingdom 
of Ends. The problem arises because in this scheme, God is reduced to a 
postulate of practical reason (necessarily posited to secure the ground of 
the Kingdom of Ends beyond the law). Rendering God a postulate as such 
renders God unknowable, which in turn renders freedom unknowable and 
therefore impossible. As Rose says, freedom cannot be conceived by Kant 
because it depends upon the prior distinction between the necessity (theo-
retical reason/legality) and freedom (practical reason/morality). Freedom 
can only be conceived in a negative sense: freedom from necessity.9 As Rose 
explains: “For Kant . . . freedom means freedom from the sensuous world, 
from the necessity of nature. To Hegel this notion of freedom is ‘a flight 
from the finite.’ The rigid dichotomy between the sensuous world (the fi-
nite, nature) and the supersensuous world (the infinite, freedom) prevents 
the comprehension of either. By degrading empirical existence in order to 
emphasize that the infinite is utterly different, the infinite is itself debased. 
8. Rose, Hegel contra Sociology, 1.
9. Rose, Hegel contra Sociology, 55.
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For it is deprived of all characterization, and hence turned into an empty 
abstraction, an idol, made of mere timber.”10
The above quote provides a context for her repeated claim in Hegel 
contra Sociology that Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute 
is banished or suppressed, if the absolute cannot be thought.11 For Rose, the 
idea of all Hegel’s thought is to unify theoretical and practical reason. When 
Hegel employs reason [Vernunft], he implies the identity of the subject and 
object, because reason is the condition of actuality. And when Hegel speaks 
of Absolute knowledge, he is naming a particular standpoint of reason, 
the standpoint from which the sets of relations that allow thought to work 
the way it does are shown to be the determinations that are constative of 
being.12 For Hegel, the task of philosophy is not to set out what can and 
cannot be known, or in what capacity, but the articulation of the determi-
nations of actuality. Hegel’s speculative idealism, as opposed to Kant’s ab-
stract idealism, is therefore characterized by a concern for the relationship 
between self-consciousness and the forms of institutions that give rise to 
sociality. Hegel’s idealism demands of philosophical thought that it not be 
undertaken as a purely analytical exercise in a vacuum from the constitutive 
communities that make thought possible in the first place. 
Girard’s Comic Hypothesis
At this point, I want to consolidate Rose’s Hegelian critique of social theory 
by way of critically engaging René Girard’s provocative “Comic Hypothesis.” 
Published the same year as Violence and the Sacred, it provides a comple-
mentary thesis on mimesis only from the perspective of comedy. Rose has 
critiqued Girard’s Violence and the Sacred in her later work The Broken 
Middle, and so the aim of this section is to develop her critique of Girard 
and highlight the continuity of her early and later critical approach, while 
keeping the role of comedy and social theory to the fore. 
Girard makes the argument for a universal anthropological theory of 
violence and sacrifice to which the Gospels offer an exceptional alternative. 
According to Girard, violence can be traced back to the mimetic character 
of desire. We desire not simply in our capacity as autonomous individuals 
(Girard’s critique of Hegel), nor for the intrinsic value of an object as such, 
but intersubjectively. We desire things because they are already desired by 
another; desire is mimetic and, in the round of desire, the competition for 
10. Ibid., 98.
11. Ibid., 42.
12. Dudley, Understanding German Idealism, 146.
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an object or status inevitably leads to mimetic rivalry. Murderous violence is 
only averted through a scapegoat mechanism (a third). A sacrificial victim 
must be found to focus their collective envy. The death of the scapegoat 
placates the aggression and re-establishes the social bond. However, the 
mechanism of the scapegoat is characteristically obscured—the basis of all 
mythological thinking—because the scapegoat is a substitute victim, not 
chosen for any intrinsic quality as such. The Gospels are the exception to the 
extent that they are written from the perspective of the innocent victim, and 
hence expose the mechanism for what it is: a myth that sustains arbitrary 
violence. 
In “A Comic Hypothesis,” Girard presents mimetic theory as the uni-
fying theory behind the classically given distinction between tragedy and 
comedy. As Girard says: “[C]omedy and tragedy . . . are very close to each 
other.”13 The essay proceeds through structural comparison of the simi-
larities between Moliere’s Bourgeois gentleman and Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex, 
and moves to highlight the mutual catharsis in both comedy and tragedy, 
which Girard allies to ritual expulsion and purification. Laughter, he tells 
us, “must get rid of something.”14 When we laugh “we are really laughing 
at something which could and, in a sense, which should happen to anyone 
who laughs, not excluding ourselves.” This, Girard argues, “clearly shows 
the nature of the threat, unperceived yet present, which laughter is always 
warding off, the still unidentified object it has to expel.”15
Nowhere is this more evident that the tickle, the proto-joke. The 
laughter elicited from a tickle relies on both the real threat to one’s ability 
to control the environment, while at the same time that threat being nil: 
the conditions for laughter are contradictory. This is the perilous balance. 
Girard offers tickling as the proto-mimetic act that can be understood as 
a joyous de-realization of our senses. The moment of laughter is precisely 
the moment one’s very physiological being is scapegoated, only internally, 
rather than externally—rather than expel another in the round of sacrifice 
and violence, one expels oneself. That is to say, laughter is dependent upon 
expelling all air from the lungs, henceforth rendering the subject helpless, 
succumbing to the very condition he or she seeks to ward off. Moreover, 
as Arron Schuster puts it, the tickle is “the Ur-joke, the zero-degree of 
comedy” and “the primordial manifestation of culture”; “tickling stands as 
the momentous entry-point into the universe of simulation, or to cite the 
13. Girard, “Perilous Balance,” 821
14. Ibid., 815.
15. Ibid., 818. 
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Greek term, mimesis.”16 If mimesis is the basis of comedy and culture, then 
laughter is what prevents mimesis from descending into murderous rivalry, 
expelling the obscure object by turning it on oneself. 
Girard and Natural Law
At first sight, it might appear counterintuitive to claim of the above that 
Girard offers us a variant of natural law to the extent that he begins not with 
the abstract individual but from the intersubjectivity of desire. However, 
Girard’s theory bears all the hallmarks of a form of scientific empiricism, a 
variant of the positivist tradition of sociology; it extrapolates from comedy 
the presence of more “natural” laughter to reveal the truth of the scape-
goating mechanism and explain the constitution of society as a whole. For 
Girard, the laughter that erupts from the tickle is a kind of cosmic echo of 
the protosocial gesture, the original violent sacrifice. As Rose would later 
critically argue of Girard: “[V]iolence is here not so much ‘hypothesized’ 
as hypostatized.”17 Or, to develop Hegel’s critique of Kant, mimetic rivalry 
is understood within the transcendental register, it functions as the a priori 
principle, the key to sacrifice. In the first instance, this renders violence 
unknowable as evidenced by Girard’s claim that violence becomes that 
“beautiful totality whose beauty depends on its being inaccessible and 
impenetrable.”18 Because without the empirical appreciation of the historic 
forms of sacrifice feeding back into his understanding of violence and sac-
rifice in the first place, only what counts as sacrificial-violence is violence. 
One might enquire for example as to the degree his encoding of sacrificial 
violence is already determined by the patriarchy of his discourse?
In the second instance, Girard’s account owes something to bour-
geois property law or rather, a John Milbank puts it, Girard maps liberal 
social theory into his sociological anthropology to the extent he assumes 
a prereligious and precultural chaos of desire. Desire, in its natural state, is 
nonhierarchical (in the sense that desire might be the desire for an objective 
good), it is desire only for that which others desire. It follows from this, that 
the original scene assumes one of competing equals (i.e., bourgeois property 
relations) with the inevitable violence as result of that competition. In other 
words, Girard’s appeal to a “natural scene,” like his appeal to laughter, takes 
its assumptions from the liberal coding of society of which violence is the 
principle outcome and religion (myth/laughter) is invented as a secondary 
16. Schuster, “A Philosophy of Tickling.” 
17. Rose, The Broken Middle, 151.
18. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 157.
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phenomenon, designed to deal with the crisis of desire. Thus, as Milbank 
point out, Girard remains entirely within the functionalist definition of 
religion.19
Part II: The Speculative Moment of Comedy
Key to Rose’s reading of Hegel is the significance she attaches to Hegel’s 
speculative reasoning [begreifenden]. To take an example from grammar 
as Hegel does, to understand a proposition “speculatively” means that “the 
identity which is affirmed between subject and predicate is seen equally to 
affirm a lack of identity between subject and predicate.” In other words, in 
reading a given proposition, one should not assume the identity of the given 
subject as already contained in the predicate [Hegel’s critique of natural 
law], but rather see it as a work, something to be “achieved.”20
For example, read speculatively, “God exists” does not predicate the 
raw attribute of existence to an empty name, but as Rose says, it “implies 
that we, finite beings, are not free. God is a pictorial, imaginative name for 
something which ordinary consciousness finds impossible to conceive,” that 
is, the relation of the finite to the infinite. Read speculatively, the claim God 
exists “refers to our experience that, as particular individuals, we are not 
immediately universal, we are not species, not God, not infinite, that we 
live in societies where our experience as individuals does not correspond 
to the experience of all . . . we are limited, but can become aware of the de-
terminations of the limit.”21 This means that any recognition constitutive of 
“knowing” is also misrecognition. Likewise, to speak of the absolute specu-
latively is to speak of the work that must be put into thinking the social; the 
absolute, for Hegel, is not an entity, but a process, undertaken speculatively.
Throughout Hegel contra Sociology, Rose insists that the identity of 
religion and the state is the fundamental speculative proposition of Hegel’s 
thought; or rather, the speculative experience of the lack of identity between 
religion and the state is the basic object of Hegel’s exposition. As Žižek later 
explains, commenting directly upon the above passage, to read the proposi-
tion speculatively is not to assert their mutual identity (theocracy), nor to 
see it as a wistful aspiration. Rather, it is to recognize that, where the state 
is founded upon religion, religion is given expression in a perverted way, 
not for reasons concerning the inadequacy of state institutions, but for the 
insufficiency articulated in the notion of religion itself: “[T]he inadequacy 
19. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 394.
20. Rose, Hegel contra Sociology, 49; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 38. 
21. Rose, Hegel contra Sociology 94.
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of the actual state to the Christian religion qua its foundations corresponds 
to and has its ground in the inadequacy of the Christian religion itself to 
its own Notion.”22 In other words, the lack of identity between the two is a 
reflection of a lack inherent in the initial notion.
Rose reads Hegel in a manner that, as the above indicates, informs 
Žižek. This is not the triumphalist Hegel for whom the phenomenology 
legitimizes “the phantasy of historical completion with the imprimatur of 
suprahistorical, absolute method, but focuses relentlessly on the historical 
production and reproduction of those illusionary contraries which other 
systems of scientific thought naturalise, absolutize, or deny.”23 In Rose’s 
reading, Truth in the absolute ethical life arises, as Žižek would say, from 
misrecognition, the basis of comedy.24 
The Comedy of Hegel
Read from the speculative standpoint, Hegel’s Phenomenology unveils the se-
ries of contradictions that arise when one starts from the a priori separation 
of the subject from the conditions of its formation. The various categories 
Hegel develops, such as the unhappy conscience or the beautiful soul, sketch 
out the historical consequences of the split that arises when the autonomy of 
the subject is posited as separate from the substance (totality) of ethical life, 
and thereby afflict the substance of ethical life.25 The Phenomenology on her 
reading is a kind of Divina Comedia,26 a comedy of misrecognition: “Let me 
shoot from the pistol: first, spirit in the Phenomenology means the drama of 
misrecognition which ensures at every stage and transition of the work—a 
ceaseless comedy, according to which our aims and outcomes constantly 
mismatch each other, and provoke yet another revised aim, action and dis-
cordant outcome. Secondly, reason is therefore comic, full of surprises, of 
unanticipated happenings, so that the comprehension is always provisional 
and preliminary.”27
The Phenomenology is not the revocation of alienated externalization, 
nor a teleology of reconciliation, nor a dominating absolute knowledge. The 
Phenomenology is not a success, it is a gamble. For the perpetual occurrence 
of inversion and misrepresentation can only be undermined, or “brought 
22. Žižek For They Know Not What They Do, 104.
23. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 3.
24. Žižek, “The Truth Arises from Misrecognition: Part I,” 190.
25. Abbinett, Truth and Social Science, 22.
26. Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 75.
27. Ibid., 72.
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into fluidity” by allusion to the law of their determination, to the causality 
of fate.28
Hegel on Comedy
If there is a criticism of Rose to be made at this point, it is by her own 
admission that what concerns her is “not what Hegel says about comedy 
as such, but the movement of the Absolute as comedy.”29 Hegel had already 
linked the role of dialectical thinking to the comic as such. His insight that 
the nature of thinking is dialectical and as such understanding must fall into 
contradiction was of capital importance to his project30 and comic action 
posed the contradiction between what is absolutely true and its realization 
in individuals more profoundly than other aesthetic forms.31 The implica-
tion here is that comedy is not merely an instance of dialectical play; rather, 
as Stephen Law has argued, Hegel sees comedy playing a key role in the de-
velopment of humankind, contributing to the growth of Spirit and freedom. 
In the aesthetics (to take Hegel’s later works first), poetry, of which 
comedy is a subset, like all art, gives expression to the absolute to the extent 
it expresses the relation between the human (particular) and divine (univer-
sal); it is the work of negation in service of the absolute ethical life;32 and 
“[t]he only important thing for a work of art [within which comedy is dis-
cussed] is to present what corresponds with reason and spiritual truth.”33 
Art is only truly art if it fulfills its supreme task, “when it has placed itself in 
the same sphere as religion and philosophy, and when it is simply one way 
of bringing to our minds and expressing the Divine, the deepest interests of 
mankind, and the most comprehensive truths of the spirit . . . . Art shares 
this vocation with religion and philosophy, but in a special way, namely by 
displaying even the highest [reality] sensuously, bringing it thereby nearer 
to the senses, to feeling, and to nature’s mode of appearance.”34
In the Phenomenology, Hegel introduces comedy under the subhead-
ing “The Spiritual Work of Art.” The section dialectically sets out the way 
art has represented the relation of the human to divine, the particular to the 
universal. In epic narrative, the narrator represents the gods through speech, 
28. Rose, Hegel contra Sociology, 159.
29. Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 64.
30. Hegel The Encyclopaedia Logic, §11.
31. Hegel, Aesthetics, 1201.
32. Ibid., 7.
33. Ibid., 1197.
34. Ibid., 7.
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with the narrative medium depicting the actions of the gods (universal) as 
the actions of men (the particular); by way of negation, in dramatic tragedy 
it is the actions of the actor—as opposed to speech—that represents the 
gods. Yet in both cases, the relation between the two (universal/particular) 
is posed as s synthetic combination: the universal remains external to the 
individual.35 In epic narrative, the gods’ actions may well take the form of 
men’s actions, but the universal remains unrestricted and withdrawn from 
the connection. In tragic drama, the split is manifest in the actor’s employ-
ment of a mask: the actor qua acting may well represent a god, but only in 
the capacity of an actor.36 In comedy, we encounter the final spiritual work 
of art, the negation of the negation. In comedy, “The self-consciousness of 
the hero must step forth from his mask.”37 In comedy “the actual self of the 
actor coincides with what he impersonates”;38 comedy sits as it does for 
Kierkegaard, a zone of transition to revealed religion, that is, Christianity. In 
Christianity, God appears directly as a particular individual and therefore 
Christianity is the religion of comedy while true comedy implicitly points 
beyond art to religion. Read from the perspective of comedy, Hegel and 
Kierkegaard appear much closer together than is usually accredited. 
Tragedy and Comedy
For Hegel, comedy is situated further along the road to freedom: “The 
actualization of freedom in the aesthetic sphere is nascent in tragedy and 
fully developed in comedy. The reason is that truly tragic action necessarily 
presupposes either a live conception of individual freedom and indepen-
dence or at least an individual’s determination and willingness to accept 
freely and on his own account the responsibility for his own act and its 
consequences.”39
For Hegel, a tragic plot turns on two independently valid yet irrec-
oncilable positions. In Hegel’s reading of Antigone, for example, Antigone 
honors her brother, and thus represents the “bond of kinship, the gods of 
the underworld.” Creon by contrast “honors Zeus alone, the dominating 
power over public life and social welfare.” As Hegel argues, notwithstanding 
the validity of their purpose, they carry it out in a one-sided manner, unable 
35. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 441.
36. Ibid., 450. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid., 452.
39. Hegel, Aesthetics,1205.
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not to infringe upon others.40 However, as Hegel also maintains, there re-
mains within the tragic drama a moment of reconciliation in as much as 
the dramatic representation of two irreconcilable yet valid standpoints pre-
cludes the audience from taking sides; in this way, the audience is spared the 
one-sidedness of reflection that besets the tragic characters of the drama: 
contradiction is turned into reconciliation.41
Tragedy encapsulates the contradiction between autonomy and de-
termination; the characters’ standpoint and the wider determining events 
between. In tragedy, external circumstances take precedence over the sub-
jective positions in a way that leads to misfortune. For the emergence of 
comedy, however, Hegel tells us, “there must have asserted itself in a still 
higher degree the free right of the subjective personality and its self-assured 
dominion.”42 In this sense, comedy is a radicalization of tragedy (both 
poles). Both dramatic forms rely on the contradiction between the aims of 
a character and the external situation, however, “in a comic action the con-
tradiction between what is absolutely true and its realization in individuals 
is posed more profoundly” and therefore requires a more stringent solution. 
In contrast to tragedy, “what is destroyed in this [comic] solution cannot 
be either fundamental principle or individual character.”43 As Stephen Law 
succinctly puts it, “in tragedy, the choice is given: either autonomy or deter-
mination; the protagonist must choose. In comedy, the subject can always 
rise above the contradiction. In comedy, it is us who decide the forms of 
behaviour; comedy needs no gods because comics are. We dispense justice 
and the penalty.”44 While in tragedy the protagonist’s commitment to a set 
of values results in his or death, in comedy the protagonist survives and 
freedom shines through.45 Comedy thereby takes art to its limit: beyond 
comedy, there is no further Aesthetic manifestation of freedom, there is only 
religion and philosophy.
By way of an example, one might consider Roberto Benigni’s tragicom-
edy La Vita Bella (1996) in which he plays Guido, a Jewish Italian Bookseller 
who, upon being interned in a concentration camp with his son (Giosuè) and 
wife (Dora), constructs an imaginative and alternate worldview to shield his 
son from the true horror. Following a set of given tasks such as hide-n-seek, 
rewarded by points, the first child to reach a thousand points will win a 
40. Ibid., 1197.
41. Ibid., 1199.
42. Ibid., 1205.
43. Ibid., 1201.
44. Law, “Hegel and the Spirit of Comedy,” 117.
45. Huddleston, “Hegel on Comedy,” 11.
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tank. At the level of tragedy, Guido, whose virtue remains intact throughout 
the film, is eventually shot, overcome by the external circumstances. Yet 
at the level of comedy, he is able to rise above the contradiction between 
autonomy and determination to the extent he is also able to determine the 
external circumstances in the sense that in the end his fantasy construction 
is vindicated. When the U.S. Army arrives to liberate the camp, at its helm is 
a Sherman tank in which the Giosuè is driven away to safety. 
What then does Girard make of the distinction between comedy and 
tragedy? Comedy, Girard argues, lends itself to structural effects rather than 
what arises from an individual’s character. In other words, comedy shifts the 
focus from the individual to the pattern of life itself. Comedy demands pas-
sions that are identical; whereas tragedy demands “unique sentiments.”46 
And it is by virtue of its immediacy and “structural” component that Girard 
also considers comedy a radicalization of tragedy, only now for the opposite 
reasons: comedy is more crushing than tragedy: “[T]he vengeance of the 
gods, meaninglessness of destiny, and the malice of the ‘human condition’ 
may well crush the individual but not to the extent they do in the case of 
comic patterns which are truly ‘structural’ in the sense that they dominate 
individual reactions and fully account for them .  .  . whereas individual 
thinking is unable to take them into account. The structural patters of the 
comic therefore deny the sovereignty of the individual more radically than 
either god or destiny.”47
Laughter, for Girard, is further along toward a negative reaction to a 
given threat. If, for Hegel, the tragic hero is crushed by external situation all 
the while maintain fidelity to a given set of values, for Girard, it is the comic 
who is more determinately crushed by a situation in which even the very 
values are destroyed. Whereas for Hegel, comedy is marked by a sovereignty 
of the subject to the extent they can change the determinate situation, for 
Girard, the comic’s very being is eclipsed by the sacrificial mechanism and 
its arbitrary sway. For Hegel, comedy implies the radicalization of both the 
subjective and objective elements; Girard’s view of comedy radicalizes only 
the objective and hence remains entirely on the side of the tragic. 
Part III: Girard, Žižek, and the Broken Middle
Rose takes up her critique of Girard in The Broken Middle where she extends 
(considerably) her critique of dualisms in the light of Hegel. Only now, the 
speculative position is identified as the broken middle: “[A]ll dualistic 
46. Girard, “A Perilous Balance,” 817.
47. Ibid., 816.
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relations to ‘the other,’ to ‘the world’ are attempts to quieten and deny the 
broken middle, the third term which arises out of misrecognition.” This 
“third term” is law: “My relation to myself is mediated by what I recognize 
or refuse to recognize in your relation to yourself; while your self-relation 
depends on what you recognize of my relation to myself.” The law, “in all its 
various historical adventures—[is] the comedy of misrecognition.” And this 
makes the meaning of law inseparable from the meaning of Bildung, that 
is, education, formation, and cultivation, the work of which is the work of 
love.48 
In The Broken Middle, Rose turns to Kierkegaard to develop a “phe-
nomenology of law”: How does Law appear to consciousness? The “middle” 
is a third space, not the agnostic and unitary space of secular liberalism, 
but a place of anxiety to the extent it is the sheer givenness of the political 
and ethical situation that resists any attempt to posit either a retreat into 
sanctified origins or utopian ends. The concern of politics is not to provide 
a solution that sutures the diremptions of modern life, such as morality and 
legality, religion and the state, because those fields, as Hegel appreciated, 
already arise out of the process of diremptions.49 Her aim then is to recover 
anxiety within our political and ethical discourse, “re-assigning it to the 
middle.”50
And it is precisely this type of anxious labor toward “Absolute know-
ing” that Girard resists. As Rose highlights, Girard is a gnostic, that is, a 
dualist, because the victim mechanism of scapegoating implies creation, in 
the first instance, is evil, the result of a “violent demiurge demanding violent 
sacrifice” in the face of a “chaos of undifferentiated mimesis” that can only 
momentarily be suspended.51 All the while, the Godhead, the Christian 
exception to myth, the god of love, sees humanity not as sinful as such, 
merely unenlightened as to the truth of mimetic theory, although the socio-
logical foundation in chaos remains. In other words, he overemphasized the 
distinction between the violence of the scapegoat mechanism (nature), and 
the love, and God (grace) such that freedom is only ever freedom from the 
basic mechanism he posits of culture, that is, the negative rejection of the 
mechanism with only the Christian counter sacrifice as abstract principle. 
Theologically, as Milbank points out, this amounts to the adoption of an 
extrinsic God52 and thus affirms the autonomy of the secular realm. As An-
48. Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 74–75.
49. Rose, The Broken Middle, 286.
50. Lloyd, “On the Uses of Gillian Rose,” 699.
51. Rose, The Broken Middle, 147.
52. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 394.
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drew Shanks put it, Girard’s is an attempt to think “from the outside about 
religion, as opposed rather than the type of thinking that springs right from 
the very middle of a community’s existential brokenness.”53 
The Severe Style
Little wonder Rose characterized Girard’s writing in terms of the “severe 
style”—a cognate of what Kierkegaard called the ethical. How so? “The se-
vere style” is taken from Hegel’s aesthetic writings; it is her judgment upon 
his early Jena writings, serving as a propaedeutic to the political task. As 
Rose writes, “the political problem could not be solved in the severe style.”54 
The 
severe style is that higher abstraction of beauty which clings 
to what is important and expresses and presents it in its chief 
outlines, but still despises charm and grace, grants domination 
to the topic alone, and above all does not devote much industry 
and elaboration to accessories. Thus the severe style still lim-
its itself to reproducing what is present and available. In other 
words, while on the one hand, in content it rests, in respect of 
ideas and presentation, on the given, e.g. on the present sac-
rosanct religious tradition, on the other hand, for the external 
form it allows complete liberty to the topic and not to its own 
invention.55
To clarify the above, one could say that the severe style makes no con-
cession to the role of subjectivity; to put the matter in Kierkegaard’s terms, 
it is concerned with the what, not the how, of subjectivity: the “severe style 
sharply repulses any subjective judgement.”56 So the point Rose is making 
is that Girard’s work cannot answer the political question precisely because 
politics requires something of risk in negotiating the middle, that is, law; 
herein lies its “absence of irony—or its dramatic cognates, humor or face-
tiousness—in the presentation of a theory.”57
53. Shanks, Against Innocence, 107.
54. Rose, Hegel contra Sociology, 51.
55. Hegel, Aesthetics, 616–17.
56. Ibid., 620.
57. Rose, The Broken Middle, 141.
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The Standpoint of Faith
In Hegel contra Sociology, the severe style is contrasted with the specula-
tive disposition towards the absolute ethical life; in The Broken Middle the 
severe style is contrasted with Kierkegaard’s category of the “ethical,” that is, 
the realm of universal law. Kierkegaard identified the religious stage with 
the exception to the rule; the religious stage invites the “suspension” of the 
ethical in a moment of faith, as exemplified for Kierkegaard by the Akedah. 
For Girard, employing the a priori form of sacrificial reasoning, the 
story of Abraham and Isaac amounts to a condensed form of mimetic the-
ory, charting both the call for infant sacrifice and its replacement by animal 
sacrifices, which itself stands not simply as a replacement for Isaac but a 
portent of the sacrifice to come in Christ: the end of animal sacrifice points 
to the end of the sacrificial mechanism qua sacrifice. 
By contrast, Rose takes Kierkegaard’s line: Abraham may well be ac-
corded the title “father of faith,” yet understood ethically, Abraham set out 
to “murder” Isaac.58 What gives Abraham his greatness therefore cannot be 
his moral code, but rather the fidelity he maintains to God’s word, that is, 
his ability to suspend the social in its ethical considerations, maintaining 
instead a passionate commitment to God: the teleological suspension of the 
ethical. As Rose says, expanding on Kierkegaard:
[T]o adopt the standpoint of faith is to be willing to stake one-
self in the middle, between the arbiter of law (the sovereign will) 
and the victim. Faith is this in-between: to occupy the middle is 
to take precisely a stance on love and violence. Faith: acknowl-
edges violence in love and the love in violence because the law 
is in both: the violence in love—Abraham’s exclusive, violent 
love of Isaac; the love in violence—his willingness to bind Isaac 
with faith not with resignation, not with the prospect of loss, 
but a free offering, freely given—oblation not sacrifice. It is this 
witness alone—this always already knowing yet being willing 
to stakes oneself again—that prevents one from becoming an 
arbitrary perpetrator or an arbitrary victim; that prevents one, 
actively or passively, from acting with arbitrary violence. Such 
witnessing is always ready—it is therefore the beginning in the 
middle: the middle in the beginning—holding itself alert in the 
anxiety and equivocation of each.59
58. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 30.
59. Rose, The Broken Middle, 148–49.
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Rose and Tragedy
Yet here the charge may be laid that Rose fails to appreciate fully the comic 
mode Hegel sets out in distinction to tragedy. As Milbank puts it, by situat-
ing herself within the broken middle, she both accepts Hegel’s radicalization 
of Kantian dualisms while being resigned to them. For this reason her ethics 
come across as “chastend, tragic, and less jocular gloss, a form of postmod-
ern impossibilism, the new opium of the intellectual . . . a Hegelian variant 
on hopelessness.”60 Indeed, if comedy amounts to the pathos of misrecog-
nition, is not comedy turned into its very opposite? Take for example her 
conclusion to The Broken Middle: the more the middle is dirempted the 
more it becomes sacred in ways that figure its further diremptions. Said 
otherwise, we try to heal the splits by which we negotiate society with imag-
ined “holy” middles (i.e., utopian goals) without appreciating the ways we 
further ratify the very splits. So, while comedy maintains a social-critical 
task to the extent it makes the failings of individuals and in particular the 
failings of contemporary society its prime focus, it also remains captive to 
them. Arguably, it is a reading further ratified by Rowan Williams evalua-
tion of her comic sensibility when he situates her comedy under the “sad-
ness of the King,” that is, our brokenness.61 
Or, by way of a further example, consider her critique of Holocaust 
piety in film. What she refuses in the representation of fascism is the stand-
point of the voyeur, that is, one in which the viewer remains distant from 
the events, unimplemented, while allowing that subject nonetheless a ca-
thartic revulsion or infinite pity to manifest—a case of what Girard would 
call, scapegoating. The point is not simply to defend our interests over and 
against the other, but to encounter violence legitimized by our own sense 
of the individual moral will. Hence her proclivity toward Kazuo Ishiguro’s 
The Remains of the Day over Spielberg’s Schindler’s List. In the former, the 
attraction for German Nazism is drawn out through the organization of the 
English aristocratic household and the collusion of servants with masters; 
the viewer is not left intact. In the latter, the evil of the genocide is rendered 
into an unfathomable and unforgivable crime that precludes the inner ten-
dency we can all bear toward fascism.62 
60. Milbank, “On the Paraethical,” 78.
61. Williams, “The Sadness of the King,” 1.
62. Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 54.
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A Kenotic Reading of Girard
There remains however another way to read Girard, which takes into ac-
count the kenotic trajectory of Hegel’s thought. Recall Hegel’s description of 
comedy qua representation: comedy marks the end of aesthetic representa-
tion (and thus art in general) in the sense that in comedy the actual self of 
the actor coincides with what he impersonates. There is a kenotic logic at 
play here that mirrors Hegel’s kenotic Christology. According to Hegel, God 
initially divests himself of abstract substance by contracting into man (Jesus 
coincides with what he impersonates) to then be finally self-emptied on the 
cross (the exemplary of love) such that “what dies on the cross is indeed 
God himself, not just his ‘finite container’ but the God of the beyond.”63 
Following this double self-divestment, the single individual reestablishes 
the relation to the Absolute qua the community (Spirit) of believers (the 
synthesis of the individual and universal), and takes on the contingency of 
belief. As Žižek says, Spirit refers directly to the corporal body of faithful: 
“[the] Holy Spirit of their community.”64
For Žižek, ritual or ceremonial precepts often operate on the assump-
tion of a metaphysical Other to which a given sacrifice is offered. Yet as 
Žižek remarks of the very title of Girard’s work, Things Hidden since the 
Foundation of the World, while it implies in a gnostic vein some terrifying 
and mysterious power overseeing and sustaining the sacrificial process, it 
masks the realization that there is no big Other:65 the law is grounded in 
its own tautology. And herein is the key to rereading Girard. Because the 
gospel story is told from the perspective of the innocent victim rather than 
the mob it renders the entire contingency of sacrificial violence transpar-
ent, it exposes the impotence of the ritual or a supposed Master to appease. 
In this way, it brings into question the entire efficiency of the scapegoat 
mechanism. In other words, there is a kenotic logic involved in Girard’s hy-
pothesis, such that once we discern the Christian revelation of truth in this 
regard, that is, the truth by which the sacred is deprived of its power; we step 
out from the mask of myth (sacrificial violence) and assume the subsequent 
responsibility. In this sense, to read Girard in kenotic terms is to say that we 
can no longer pretend that scapegoating is anything other than arbitrary 
violence to contain mimesis and our choice to participate in the mob is 
precisely that, a self-grounding choice. Or rather, read from the perspec-
tive of Žižek, Girard’s work returns us to the primacy of the political, Rose’s 
63. Žižek, “Dialectical Clarity versus the Misty Conceit of Paradox,” 257.
64. Ibid., 282–83. 
65. Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 972.
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middle: “What the inexistence of the big Other signals is that every ethical 
and/ or moral edifice has to be grounded in an abyssal act which is, in the 
most radical sense imaginable, political. Politics is the very space in which, 
without any external guarantee, ethical decisions are made and negotiated 
[the broken middle]. The idea that one can ground politics in ethics, or that 
politics is ultimately a strategic effort to realize prior ethical positions, is a 
version of the illusion of the ‘big Other.’”66
In this way, Žižek makes good on Girard in a way that avoids the se-
verity of Rose’s critique. Seen from the perspective of Žižek, Girard’s dis-
tinction between myth and gospel might be reworked in terms of Hegel’s 
distinction between tragedy and comedy, where comedy functions precisely 
as a kenotic moment in which socio-symbolic is suspended, through the 
irruption of laughter. That is to say, one occupies the position of risk, from 
which the middle comes into view, this is the speculative moment, when the 
political coincides with the religious in a way which exposes their mutual 
relation in their lack of identity; there is no big Other. 
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, one might pose the question: What might the fore-
given argument mean for ecclesial self-understanding? Here, one need only 
recall Girard’s account of laughter as the proto-kenotic gesture constitutive 
of society. That being the case, it might be argued that comedy, not tragedy, 
logically stands at the foundation of Creation and likewise, Christ was not 
born out of tragic necessity, rather, Christianity arose at the point at which 
God was tickled by Jesus, tickled by himself in the way that only the kenotic 
laughter of Trinitaian difference could account for, that the event of gospel 
truth has happened, and now it is up to us; laughter is not subsequent to 
our brokeness but the laughter of brokeness. This comedy of the absolute, I 
wager, stands as the propaedeutic to a given political task, restoring not just 
anxiety but mirth also to the speculative middle.
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